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TORTS: INDUCING BREACH OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT
CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACTS
IN Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.' an attorney brought suit for
intentional interference with contractual relations. The plaintiff alleged
that an agent of the defendant in settling with the plaintiff's client had
advised and caused the client to dismiss the plaintiff and deprive him
of the fee he was to have received under his contingent fee contract.2
The defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained by the trial
court. The California Supreme Court reversed, with directions to over-
rule the demurrer. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations had
stated a cause of action because defendant's intentional interference was
unjustified.
In recent years a number of suits have been brought by attorneys
seeking to recover damages from third persons who, in effecting settle-
ments, have induced breach of contingent fee contracts.' Several juris-
dictions, including California, have recognized the attorney's cause of
action.4  This position is consistent with the increasingly wide judicial
S14. Cal. Rptr. 294 (Sup. Ct. 196,).
"Plaintiffs were to advance all expenses necessary for the preparation of the case
and for court costs and were to receive one third of the amount of the recovery re-
maining after deduction of the costs." Id. at 295.
8See State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 195o); Barnes
v. Quigley, 49 A.zd 467 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1946); Employers Cas. Co. v. Moore,
6o Ariz. 544, 14z P.zd 414 (1943); Freed v. Manchester Service, 165 Cal. App. zd
i86, 331 P.2d 689 (Dist. Ct. App. x958); Tauro v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur.
Corp., 297 Mass. 234, 8 N.E.2d 773 (1937) ; Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co., 279
Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723 (1932); Krause v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 331 Mich.
i9, 49 N.W.zd 41 (1951)5 Lurie v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 270 N.Y. 379, 1
N.E.2d 472 (1936) ; Gordon v. Mankoff, 146 Misc. 258, 261 N.Y. Supp. 888 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1931); Neff v. Willmott, Roberts & Looney, 170 Okla. 460, 41 P.2d 86
(935) ; Wahl v. Strous, 344 Pa. 402, 25 A.2d 820 (1942) ; Keels v. Powell, 207 S.C.
97, 34 S.E.zd 48z (945).
See also Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F.zd 547 (oth Cir. 1955),
in which the breach was not induced to effect a settlement, but to substitute defendant's
agent for the plaintiff.
'See State Farm Fire Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 184 F.2d 447 ( 4 th Cir. i95o); Freed v.
Manchester Service, x65 Cal. App. zd x86, 331 P.2d 689, (Dist. Ct. App. 1958)5
Lurie v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 270 N.Y. 379, 1 N.E.2d 472 (1936); Gordon v.
Mankoff, 146 Misc. z58, 261 N.Y. Supp. 888 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931), Klauder v.
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recognition of tort liability for inducing breach of contract.' Two argu-
ments against recovery, however, have led some courts to deny the
attorneys' cause of action. The first is that, because of the nature of
attorney-client agreements, a third person not a party to the contract
cannot cause a true breach of contract.' The second is that third persons
should be privileged to interfere with attorney-client contracts in effect-
ing settlements.7
The argument that a third person cannot induce a true breach of an
attorney-client contingent fee contract is based on the privilege of the
client to dismiss his attorney at will. This position overlooks the fact
that, despite the privilege of dismissal, a client does violate his contract
if he fails to pay his attorney's fee.' In attorneys' suits against their
Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 At. 667 (1937) 5 Keels v. Powell, 207 S.C. 97, 34 S.E.2d 482
(xi4S). Cf. Wahl v. Strous, 344- Pa. 402, 25 A.2d 820 (942) (Attorney's cause of
action recognized, but plaintiff did not sustain burden of proof); Neff v. Willmott,
Roberts & Looney, 17o Okla. 460, 41 P.2d 86 (i935) (cause of action recognized, but
statute of limitations had run).
The application of tort liability for interference with contractqal relations has been
constantly expanded since the landmark case of Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & B. 216, 118
Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). See generally Avins, Inducing the Termination of Con-
tract, 24 TENN. L. REV. og9 (957); Carpenter, Interference swith; Contract Rela-
tiOns, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728 (1928); Harper, Interference with Contractual Relations,
47 Nw. U.L. REv. 873 (1953) (includes discussion of negligent interference); Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REv. 663 (1923)5 Note, 32 B.U.L. REV.
214 (i95z) (profitable relations); Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 238 (1958) (at-will
contracts) 5 Note, 6 RUTGERs L. REV. 475 (1952) (contractual negotiations).
'Tauro v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 297 Mass. 234, 8 N.E.2d 773
(1937) ; Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co., 279 Mass. 539, 181 N.E. 723 (1932).
'See Krause v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 331 Mich. 19, 49 N.W.2d 41 0 95
Cf., Employer's Cas. Co. v. Moore, 6o Ariz. 544, 142 P.zd 414 (943)5 Barnes v.
Quigley, 49 A.2d 467 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1946). In these cases the grounds for
denying the attorneys' causes of action were not clearly set forth, but in each instance
the court indicated that the defendant's action was not "unlawful interference."
' "[An attorney's contingent fee contract] is a legal and valid contract entitled to
the protection of the law, and an attorney who is wrongfully discharged is generally
entitled to the same amount of compensation as if he had completed the contemplated
services. . . . [Cases] which involve settlement by clients without the consent of their
attorneys are distinguishable. In none of them were the clients induced, as a means of
obtaining the settlements, to repudiate the contracts with their attorneys and to refuse
to pay them. In the present case plaintiffs do not complain because there may have been
a settlement but because defendants induced the [client] to repudiate the contract and
deprive plaintiffs of its benefits." 14 Cal. Rptr. at -z96.
It can be argued that the Massachusetts court, in the two cases cited in note 6 supra,
held that the defendants had induced settlement only. However, the court did not dis-
tinguish settlement from breach. In both cases there were allegations to the effect that
the plaintiff had been deprived of his fees, and that settlement had been induced with
intent to deprive the plaintiff of his fees. The court in Herbits simply said that settle-
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clients, most jurisdictions allow attorneys to recover damages for breach
of contingent fee agreements,' and others allow recovery in quantum
reruit.1°  It is, of course, arguable that there is no breach of contract
in jurisdictions that limit recovery to quantum meruit. Restitution,
however, has long been considered an alternative remedy for breach of
contract as well as a quasi-contractual remedy." Moreover, it would
seem overly conceptualistic to predicate an attorney's recovery against a
third person who interferes with a contingent fee agreement upon
whether the attorney may sue his client in contract or must sue in quasi-
contract. 2
In addition, it is questionable whether a finding that there has been
no breach in the technical sense should be fatal to the plaintiffs case.18
Recovery is allowed for types of interference other than inducing
breach. For example, courts allow recovery for inducing termination of
ment was not breach. In Tauro the court held that the "facts alleged do not warrant the
conclusion that the client broke his contract with the plaintiff."
'See, e.g., Weil v. Fineran, 78 Ark. 87, 93 S.W. 568 (19o6)5 Echlin v. Superior
Ct., 13 Cal. zd 368, 90 P.zd 63 (1939) i Goldberg v. Perlmutter, 308 Ill. App. 84, 31
N.E.zd 333 (941)5 French v. Cunningham, 149 Ind. 632, 49 N.E. 797 (1898) 5
Carter v. Dunham, xo4 Kan. 59, 177 Pac. 533 (i919); Simon v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry., 45 N.D. 251, 177 N.W. 107 (1920) ; Harrison v. Johnson, 64 Ohio App. 185, 2$
N.E.2d 615 (1940); First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bassett, 183 Okla. 592, 83 P.zd
837 (1938) ; Dolph v. Speckart, 94 Ore. 550, 186 Pac. 32 (192o); Williams v. Phila-
delphia, 208 Pa. z8z, 57 Atl. 578 (904); Brownlow v. Payne, 2 Tenn. App. 154
(1925); White v. Burch, i9 S.W.zd 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Hamlin v. Case &
Case, iSS Wash. i5o, 61 P.zd 1287 (1936) ; Clayton v. Martin, io8 W.Va. 571. 151S.E. 855 (0930).
" See, e.g., Cole v. Myers, iz8 Conn. 223, 21 A.2d 396 (1941), Hubbard v.
Goflinett, 253 Ky. 779, 70 S.W.zd 67, (1934); Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319, 283
N.W. 487 (1939) 5 Harris v. Root, 28 Mont. 159, 72 Pac. 429 (1903) ; Martin v.
Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (916).
"See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1102-21 (1951).
In New York, where attorneys are restricted to the quantum vneruit remedy in
suits against their clients, the Court of Appeals has taken the sensible and consistent view
that the attorney who recovers from a third person for inducing a breach of a contin-
gent fee agreement is limited to a quantum neruit measure of damages. Lurie v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 27o N.Y. 379, 1 N.E.zd 472 (1936).
" Plaintiffs have recovered from third persons who interfered with contracts unen-
forceable for uncertainty or within the Statute of Frauds or statute of limitations. See
Romano v. Wilbur Ellis & Co., 8z Cal. App. 2d 670, 186 P.zd 1012 (1948) ; Aalfo
Co. v. Kinney, 1o5 N.J.L. 345, 244 Atl. 715 (1929); Ringler v. Ruby, 117 Ore. 455,
244 Pac. 509 (1926) 5 Bitzke v. Folger, 231 Wis. 513, 286 N.W. 36 (1939). Promisors
have recovered for conduct making performance more onerous. McNary v. Chamber-
lain, 34 Conn. 384 (1867) ; Morris v. Blume, 55 N.Y.S.zd 196 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd
269 App. Div. 832, 56 N.Y.S.zd 414 (1945). See generally i HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
§ 6.9 (1956).
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contracts terminable at will.14 Indeed, the tort is becoming known as
"interference with contractual relations."
The second argument, that third persons effecting settlements should
be privileged to induce a breach of an attorney-client fee contract,-5 is
based on the policy of the law to encourage settlements. 16 The question
of whether such a privilege should be recognized involves a balancing of
interests. The social utility of the interest which the privilege promotes
must be greater than the social utility of protecting the interest of the
injured party to the contract.' Thus, in the instant case the social
utility of settlements and the extent to which the recognition of a privi-
lege would promote settlement must be weighed against that of attor-
ney's contingent fee contracts and the attorney-client relation.
It is believed that the court was correct in refusing to recognize a
privilege in the defendant in the Herron case. How little such a privi-
lege would further settlements is seen when it is compared with the
result obtained by the court. Under Herron, third persons retain the
right to settle their disputes, but are restrained from resorting to the
tactic of inducing a client not to pay his attorney.' 8 As a client does not
break his fee contract when he settles his dispute," but only when he
" Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 172 P.2d 867 (1946);
Wilkinson v. Powe, 300 Mich. 275, i N.W.2d 539 (t942)5 A.S. Rampell, Inc. v.
Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.zd 369, 144 N.E.2d 371 (1957); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766,
comment c (1939) 5 Avins, Inducing the Ter mination of Contract, 24 TENN. L. REV.
1o89 (1gsT).
"See cases cited in note 7 supra.
"The policy of the law to further settlements is manifested in rules such as the
one prohibiting the use of offers to settle as admissions of liability in a subsequent suit
on the claim. See generally ii AM. JUR. Compromise and Settlement § 4 (-937).
For discussion of the value of settlements see Brady, The Settlement of Controversies:
The Will and the Way To Prevent Lawsuits, 45 A.B.A.J. 471 (1959); Brown, Court
Congestion: Is Settlement the Key?, 35 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 3 (-959).
17 See I HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 6.iz (1956).
" See Gordon v. Mankoff, 146 Misc. z58, 261 N.Y. Supp. 888 (N.Y. City Ct.
93i) i Keels v. Powell, 207 S.C. 97, 34 S.E.zd 482 (945).
Of course, one is never privileged to induce a breach of contract by certain conduct,
such as fraudulent misrepresentation or physical violence. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 767, comment b 0939).
" The contingent fee contract in the Herron case included a clause in which the
client had agreed not to settle without the plaintiff's permission. The court did not
pass upon the validity of this clause. Such clauses have appeared in several of the fee
agreements in the cases under discussion, but, as in Herron, no decision has turned on
their breach.
The jurisdictions are split on the validity of these clauses. All jurisdictions, however,
will allow attorneys to recover in quantum mneruit when these agreements are broken.
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions that have held these agreements invalid have also held
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does not pay his lawyer's fee,20 there is no danger under Herron that
one who has induced a client to settle by other means can be said to have
induced a breach of contract.2 ' In addition, there is little danger that
legitimate settlements will be discouraged from fear of a jury risk. In
order to recover, the attorney must prove that the third person inten-
tionally induced the client to violate the fee agreement.22
Because of the broad scope for settlement under Herron and other
decisions that recognize a cause of action, it is obvious that the asserted
privilege actually furthers settlement very little. In addition, when it
is recognized that every dispute settled by inducing a client to breach
his contract with his attorney creates a new dispute between the attorney
and his client,13 it becomes questionable whether the privilege furthers
settlement at all. Therefore, when weighed against the disruption of
attorney-client relations which the privilege invites, neither the privilege
nor any settlement it promotes is worthy of judicial sanction.24
the contingent fee contracts of which they are a part invalid. See generally Annot.,
1i A.L.R. 1zz (1939). In such jurisdictions there would seem to be an increased
conceptualistic problem of finding a breach. Furthermore, it would seem inconsistent
not to allow third persons a privilege to induce a breach of such agreements.
20 "The client cannot, by settling, compromising, or dismissing his suit ...without
the consent of or over the objection of his attorney, deprive the attorney of his compen-
sation for the agreed amount. 5 AM. JUR. Attorneys at Law § 173 (1936).
2 There may be, however, a problem of proving intent. The person who induces
a settlement, by whatever means, with the desire to deprive the attorney of his fee under
a contract should be liable. The difficult case involves the third person who does not
desire the breach, but is virtually certain it will result from his settlement with the client.
One line of authority, not specifically involving attorney-client contracts, treats the breach
in these situations as too "remote." Prosser suggests that the incidental nature of the
breach should be a factor in granting the third person a privilege in these situations.
PROSSER, ToRTS 734-35 (.955).
22 This burden is extremely difficult to fulfill unless a witness to the settlement agree-
ment can be found who will so testify. See Klauder v. Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 Atl. 667
('937).
2 "The conduct of an insurance company in inducing an injured person to repudiate
his contract with an attorney may be detrimental not only to the interests of the attorney
but also to the interests of the client since ... the client, in addition to being deprived of
the aid and advice of his attorney, may also be liable for the full contract fee." 14 Cal.
Rptr. at 297.
See notes 9, xo, and zo supra.
" "Aside from the matter of securing for the attorney his compensation, which is
important enough, there is the more far-reaching effect upon the administration of
justice as a whole to consider, if parties to a suit were to be allowed to ignore counsel
and effect settlements behind his back. The deteriorating effect upon the entire system
of judicial administration which would follow such a course of action oft repeated is
obvious.
"From time immemorial, the relationship between attorney and client . . . has
enjoyed a peculiar and protected status in the law. It is rightly regarded as a unique
[Vol. i96i: S8z
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The two arguments examined do not provide a sound basis on which
to deny the attorney's cause of action against third persons who interfere
with the attorney's contingent fee contract. Rather, the Herron decision
and other cases recognizing the attorney's cause of action have correctly
applied the tort theory of liability for inducing breach of contract.
and confidential relationship. It necessarily implies a special trust and confidence among
its participantsi and the law looks with jealous concern upon the protection of the rela-
tion and deplores incidents between attorney and client which lead to suit. To open the
door to outside parties wantonly to come in and negotiate the destruction of the rela-
tionship would bode no good for either the practitioner, client, or the public as a whole."
Blackwell, Interference with Contract for Attorney's Fees as Cause of Action, 9 U.S.C.
SELDEN SOC. YEAR BOOK 31, 35 (194-8).
